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ABSTRACT
Code modularization provides benefits throughout the software life cycle; however, the presence
of crosscutting concerns (CCCs) in software hinders its complete modularization. Traditional mod-
ularization techniques work well under the assumption that code being modularized is functionally
orthogonal to the rest of the code; as a result, software engineers try to separate code segments
that are orthogonal in their functionality into distinct modules. However, in practice, software
does not decompose neatly into modules with distinct, orthogonal functionality. In this thesis, we
investigate the modularization of CCCs in software using two different techniques.
Firstly, we discuss IVCon, a GUI-based tool that provides a novel approach to the modulariza-
tion of CCCs. We have designed IVCon to capture the multi-concern nature of code. IVCon enables
users to create, examine, and modify their code in two different views, the woven view and the
unwoven view. The woven view displays program code in colors that indicate which CCCs various
code segments implement, while the unwoven view displays code in two panels, one showing the
core of the program and the other showing all the code implementing each concern in an isolated
module. IVCon aims to provide an easy-to-use interface for conveniently creating, examining, and
modifying code in, and translating between, the woven and unwoven views.
Secondly, we discuss LoPSiL, which is a location-based policy-specification language. LoPSiL
is Turing-complete and provides users with language constructs that enable them to manipulate
location information; hence, LoPSiL can be used to specify and enforce generic policies that might
involve location-based constraints. We have implemented a LoPSiL compiler using AspectJ, and we
observe and discuss how the use of traditional units of modularization—aspects in this case—help
modularize functionally orthogonal CCCs such as security and auditing.
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In accordance with good software-development practices, software engineers typically invest time
devising the structure of a project before they can start working on the project’s implementation.
During the design phase, software engineers attempt to modularize their code; that is, they try to
organize their code into distinct software modules. This practice in turn provides multiple benefits
to programmers:
• It makes code easier to write. Because programmers have invested time organizing their code
into functionally orthogonal modules, different programmers can work on different modules
irrespective of the implementation of other modules.
• It makes code easier to understand. By providing APIs and schematic diagrams in which
modules and interfaces between modules are clearly depicted, programmers can quickly com-
municate the structure of their software to other programmers.
• It makes code easier to maintain. Again, because of the design process, programmers know
in which file(s) to find relevant code segments when they want to add or edit features in their
software.
Ideally, to reap the maximum benefits of modularization, software engineers try to separate code
segments that are orthogonal in their functionality into distinct modules. However, in practice,
software does not decompose neatly into modules with distinct, orthogonal functionality. For
example, code that displays a popup window notifying users about a failed login attempt may be
present in a login module, while (partially) implementing various other functional concerns such
as security, GUI, and authentication; it may be equally reasonable for the window-popup code
to be located in a security, GUI, or authentication module, and at various times it may be more
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convenient to write, view, or edit the window-popup code in the context of these other modules.
Tarr et al. call this problem the “tyranny of the dominant decomposition” [1]. Although it is useful
to modularize the same code segment in various ways throughout the software life cycle, current
programming paradigms only allow modularization in fixed and limited ways (e.g., into functions,
classes, or aspects).
While one module may implement multiple software concerns (i.e., behaviors required of the
software, which are implemented in source code), it is, conversely, common for implementations of
concerns to be scattered throughout multiple modules. For example, code implementing a security
concern may be scattered throughout login, logout, and network-socket modules. Thus, code
segments implementing a concern may crosscut through implementations of other concerns; such
code segments implement crosscutting concerns (CCCs). Modularizing a CCC involves collecting
and displaying in one place all the scattered code implementing that CCC. Isolating concern code
in this way benefits programmers because it relieves them from having to browse through the whole
program to find, study, or update a single software concern.
A common example of a CCC is security. Code implementing security often tends to get
scattered throughout programs in the form of security checks (e.g., checking array bounds, checking
access permissions to a file etc.), and because security is frequently functionally orthogonal to the
rest of the program’s functionality, it makes sense to isolate code implementing security into a
module that is disjoint from the implementation of the core software.
To isolate security implementations from the core software implementation, security engineers
use policy-specification languages. Policy-specification languages such as PoET/PSLang [2], Nac-
cio [3], Polymer [4, 5] etc. are domain-specific programming languages intended to simplify the
tasks of specifying and enforcing sound security policies on untrusted (i.e., potentially insecure)
software. Modularizing security implementations using policy-specification languages implies that
code implementing security in an application, which would otherwise be scattered throughout the
application, is now present in one module (file). So, to analyze and/or modify such an application’s
security implementation would entail locating and/or modifying only one file, thereby reducing the
effort when compared to a system in which a policy-specification language was not being used, in
which case, a security engineer would have to locate every instance of a security check throughout
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the application (encompassing several files) and make changes in multiple files. We discuss the
modularization of runtime security policies further in Chapter 3.
1.1 Motivation
In his book on refactoring techniques, Fowler presents and discusses in detail, a list of 72
techniques for reorganizing code so that code becomes easier to comprehend [6, 7]. While all these
techniques help programmers improve the structure and readability of their code, some of them give
rise to a new problem. By using refactoring techniques such as Extract into Method, Extract
into Class etc. programmers essentially relocate the implementations of their program’s different
functionalities into newer files. It would make sense to do so, if the code being extracted into a
newer class or newer method were completely orthogonal in functionality to the code surrounding
it (such as code implementing security or logging in an application); however, as mentioned earlier
code often does not decompose into orthogonally-defined functionalities. As a result, traditional
refactoring techniques add to the problem of code-scattering that we discussed earlier by scattering
implementations of functionalities across multiple files. This, in turn makes it more difficult for
programmers to modify existing applications.
We observed this problem while trying to add a feature to JHotDraw [8], which is a Java-based
framework that for developing drawing editors for designing structured graphics. JHotDraw is
implemented in approximately 33,000 lines of code, and its implementation is well-structured and
easy to comprehend. Most JHotDraw files are small in size, which indicates that JHotDraw devel-
opers have used good software development practices by (recursively) modularizing code wherever
possible. However, while modifying its source code, we found that by following conventionally-good
modularization practices, JHotDraw developers have indeed scattered code implementing a single
functionality across multiple files. As a result, we spent a significant amount of time analyzing
JHotDraw’s code to locate different files in which the functionalities of our interest were present.
Thus, while current modularization practices improve code structure, they can also impede the
process of software maintenance.
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The problems described above stem from the following two properties of code found in software
systems:
• A particular code segment implements multiple functionalities.
• A particular functionality is implemented by code that is scattered across multiple methods
and files.
Thus, if we think of concerns and code segments as mathematical sets, we can see that typically
in software, there exists a many-to-many relationship between concerns and code segments imple-
menting those concerns; that is, a concern can be implemented by multiple non-contiguous code
segments, and a code segment can implement multiple concerns. However, traditional modulariza-
tion techniques restrict users into defining one-to-many relationships between concerns and code;
that is, a concern can be implemented by multiple non-contiguous code segments.
1.2 Inline Visualization of Concerns
To target the behavior of code that traditional modularization techniques do not capture, cur-
rent modularization techniques need to be augmented by using newer techniques during software
development. Correspondingly, we have implemented, in Java, an IDE called IVCon that aims to
target these problems by providing users with multiple views of their code so that users can:
• View their complete code, as it will be at runtime. This enables users to debug complete
programs; if complete programs are not available to users they could be overlooking an aspect
of their programs that might be causing an undesired effect at runtime.
• View their code in the absence of CCCs. This enables users to analyze their code when CCCs
are completely orthogonal to the functionality of the core program.
• View CCCs in isolation. In the presence of functionally orthogonal concerns, this enables
different programmers to work on different modules, independent of the implementation of
other modules (one of the benefits of traditional modularization techniques).
• View and readily identify code that implements multiple concerns. This enables users to
understand the different functionalities of their program that will get affected when a code
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segment S is modified (all the concerns that S implements get affected when a user modifies
S).
• View concerns whose implementations are scattered across multiple files readily. This ensures
that users do not have to spend time trying to find implementations of particular functional-
ities.
IVCon permits many-to-many relationships between concerns and code. That is, users can
assign scattered code segments to the same concern and can assign a single code segment to multiple,
overlapping concerns. We call code that has been assigned to multiple concerns multi-concern
code. Moreover, IVCon enforces token-level granularity in concern assignments: code assigned
to a concern must begin at the beginning of a source-language token and end at the end of a
source-language token.
IVCon enforces token-level granularity because tokens are the smallest, atomic units with mean-
ing in a programming language. Allowing finer granularity in concern assignment (e.g., character-
level granularity) would be inappropriate because tokens are the core semantic units of program-
ming languages and of concerns implemented in those languages. On the other hand, requiring
coarser granularity in concern assignment (e.g., line-level granularity) would be inappropriate as
well. Consider the code in Figure 1.1. Token-level granularity enables assignment of just the
System.currentTimeMillis() code segment to a SystemCall concern, while coarser concern-
assignment granularities, such as line- or statement-level granularity, lack the precision needed for
such a concern assignment. With token-level granularity, a user could even assign just the method
name currentTimeMillis to the SystemCall concern. At the same time, token-level granularity
prevents unreasonable concern assignments possible with finer (e.g., character-level) granularities,
such as assigning just the ‘i’ in JOptionPane to its own concern; this would be unreasonable be-
cause if ‘i’ implements a concern C, then the rest of the JOptionPane token must implement C
as well (the atomic JOptionPane token has meaning in the programming language, while the ‘i’
alone does not). Thus enforcing token-level granularity enables fine-grained, yet meaningful concern
assignments.
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JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(mainWindow.frame, "Welcome " + userName +".
Current time is " + format(System.currentTimeMillis()),
"Welcome", JOptionPane.INFORMATION MESSAGE );
Figure 1.1. Sample code demonstrating the motivation behind token-level granularity.
1.2.1 Related Work
There are many projects related to IVCon, which we next discuss in detail. Table 1.1 summarizes
the discussion.
1.2.1.1 Aspect-oriented Programming
A closely related body of research is Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) [9]; like IVCon,
AOP eases the specification and manipulation of CCCs in software. AOP languages (AOPLs)
such as AspectJ [10] and AspectC [11] define a new unit of modularization, the aspect, which is a
combination of advice (code that implements a CCC) and joinpoints (points in a program’s control
flow where advice gets executed). A complete aspect-oriented program consists of a core program
and aspects, and AOPL compilers typically weave advice from user-defined aspects into the core
program at the joinpoints specified by those aspects. Roughly speaking, then, IVCon’s unwoven
view corresponds to an aspect-oriented view of a program, as code implementing CCCs appear in
isolated modules. However, unlike standard AOP tools, IVCon:
• Allows code to be written, examined, and edited in both woven and unwoven views.
• Allows multi-concern code. For example, multi-concern code is impossible in AspectJ because
a single code segment S in the woven program cannot appear in multiple AspectJ advices (or
in both the program core and some advice)—if it did then S would have to appear multiple
times (not once) in the woven program.
• Enforces token-level granularity in concern code.
• Uses a novel interface to aid concern assignment, visualization, weaving, and unweaving.
On the other hand, IVCon is able to provide some of these features only because it disallows
joinpoints (called regions in IVCon) from being specified indirectly (i.e., as pointcuts), which AOPLs
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Table 1.1. Comparison of concern-manipulation tools.
Tool
Can
Iso-
Can Allows many-
edit
lates
modify to-many
Pro- Region
Granularity
code
con-
identical relationships
vides (i.e., joinpoint)
of
in
cern
concern between
GUI specification
concern
dual
code
code in concerns assignment
views one place and code
AspectBrowser - - -
√ √ Regular exp- Character-
ressions over
level
concern code
Visualiser - - - -
√ AspectJ point-
Line-level
cut language
FEAT - - -
√ √ Regular exp- Declaration-
ressions over
level
concern code
SoQueT - - -
√ √ Regular exp- Declaration-
ressions over
level
concern code
C4
√ √
- - -
AspectC point-
Line-level
cut language
Hyper/J -
√
-
√
-
Package, class,
Declaration-
interface, method,
level
or field names
CIDE - - -
√ √
Explicit
Nodes in
ASTs
WEB -
√
-
√
- Explicit
Character-
level
IVCon
√ √ √ √ √
Explicit Token-level
typically do allow. IVCon also lacks constructs for encapsulating or interfacing with modularized
code, which AOPLs do provide (this limitation is discussed further in Section 5.1).
1.2.1.2 Concern Visualization Tools
Turning our attention to specific AOP tools related to IVCon, Aspect-jEdit [12] plugs into the
jEdit [13] text editor and, like IVCon, allows users to view and edit concern code in the context of the
core program. Also like IVCon, Aspect-jEdit users assign code to concerns by highlighting code and
explicitly assigning it to the concern it implements, and users can assign syntactically different code
segments to the same concern. Each aspect (i.e., concern) in Aspect-jEdit is associated with a color,
and on assigning code to an aspect, that code’s background color changes to match its aspect color.
Aspect-jEdit users can hide one or more aspects and view aspects in isolation, but Aspect-jEdit does
not support multi-concern code (which simplifies its interface and text-manipulation algorithms).
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Aspect-jEdit displays syntactically equal advice multiple times in an aspect, as opposed to IVCon’s
use of subconcerns (described in Section 2.1.2); consequently, Aspect-jEdit users cannot modify all
identical concern code at once in a central concern module.
AspectBrowser [14, 15, 16], which is built on ideas from Seesoft [17], lets users specify concerns
in the form of regular expressions over characters in the source code. AspectBrowser displays a
high-level program map in which colors indicate which lines contain which CCCs. When a program
line contains more than one CCC, AspectBrowser colors the corresponding map line red. Also,
AspectBrowser users can zoom within the map to obtain a more detailed view and can click on
a colored line to view that line’s CCC and its context (i.e., the core code surrounding the CCC).
IVCon does not build a high-level program map, though it does graphically identify all code regions
implementing each CCC (using colors, flags, tooltips, and a concern-at-current-position panel in
the woven view, as well as colors, flags, and explicit region names in the unwoven view). Tools
like grep can also be used to identify and display in a single view all the code matching regular
expressions [18].
The Visualiser [19] is an Eclipse [20] plugin that helps AspectJ programmers visualize joinpoints
in their programs using a high-level program map. After assigning colors to existing aspects, the
Visualiser performs static analysis to generate a program map similar to that of AspectBrowser.
In the Visualiser map, colored lines represent the locations of joinpoints, and if multiple aspects
share a joinpoint then the Visualiser splits that line into the colors of those aspects. Concerns that
are implemented in AspectJ and used with the Visualiser can make use of AspectJ’s rich joinpoint
language. Due to its reliance on AspectJ, though, the Visualiser inherits AspectJ’s limitations of
statement-level granularity in concern assignments and one-to-many relationships between concerns
and code.
FEAT [21] and SoQueT [22] are tools available as plugins to Eclipse that help users modularize
CCCs in similar ways. In both these tools, users search their code (using regular-expression queries)
to retrieve program elements (e.g., classes, data members, methods etc.) that implement concerns.
Users can encapsulate these program elements along with other information into concern modules.
FEAT and SoQueT differ in the concern modules that they use and the information encapsulated
in those concern modules. FEAT uses concern graphs, which store program elements and relations
between different program elements, whereas SoQueT uses crosscutting concern sorts, which docu-
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ment program elements and the nature of the crosscutting concern. Both tools allow many-to-many
relationships between concerns and code and allow users to navigate code implementing concerns
in a woven view. Although the tools isolate concerns at a high level, they do not isolate all the code
implementing each concern in a single module, so these tools do not support viewing or editing
code in a fully unwoven view.
1.2.1.3 Programming Languages
The literate-programming tool WEB [23], like IVCon, allows users to document which concerns
code implements. Actually, in literate programming, documentation precedes code; users document
programs and can write prose abbreviations for code segments before expanding those abbreviations
by specifying their code implementations. Hence, WEB abbreviations could be viewed as concern
names, to which code implementations get assigned. Abbreviations can be nested and scattered
through other abbreviations, so in this view literate programming supports many-to-many relation-
ships between concerns and code. A WEB application consists of all the documentation and code
for that program; when WEB compiles the application it produces two sorts of files: human-readable
files documenting the program (with each “concern” isolated, as in IVCon’s unwoven view) and
source-code/executable files (as in IVCon’s woven view). These two sorts of files present alternate
views of the program, but users can not edit one view and then see those changes reflected in
the other. Interestingly, the documentation produced by WEB cross-references abbreviations, which
serves a purpose similar to flags in IVCon (described in Section 2.1.3).
The C4 toolkit provides an aspect-oriented approach to system-level programming [24]. As with
IVCon, C4 users can examine programs in, and translate between, two code views. In C4, these
views are called the AspectC view (in which users define aspects in AspectC) and the C4 view (in
which users view advice inlined into the program code); these are analogous to IVCon’s unwoven
and woven views. Similar to the Visualiser, C4 inherits AspectC’s lack of support for multi-concern
code and its statement-level granularity in concern code.
Hyper/J is a Java-based AOPL that introduces the concept of a hyperspace, an imaginary space
consisting of multiple dimensions of concerns [25]. Each dimension, or axis, in the hyperspace
groups concerns, while each coordinate on an axis corresponds to a single concern. Hence, a code
segment’s position in the hyperspace indicates which concerns it implements (one concern per axis
9
in the hyperspace). To build software with Hyper/J, users create a set of text files that specify
the set of features to include in the program. Concerns in Hyper/J are defined coarsely at the
granularity of declarations (e.g., methods, functions, variables, and classes). If all declarations in a
program are assigned to at least one concern, then a Hyper/J user can view any concern c in that
program in isolation, but doing so involves modifying a textual concern-mapping file to specify that
only c should be displayed (i.e., included in the program).
1.2.1.4 Feature-oriented Programming
CIDE (Colored Integrated Development Environment) [26, 27] is a tool for feature-oriented
programming that was developed concurrently with IVCon. CIDE has many similarities with both
Hyper/J and IVCon: as with Hyper/J, CIDE users can build programs by selecting the sets of
features (which are analogous to CCCs in Hyper/J and IVCon) to include in those programs; as
with IVCon, CIDE users can highlight code to assign it to features being implemented, can define
many-to-many relationships between features and code, can assign colors to features, and can view
code colored to reflect the features being implemented. However, there are at least four high-level
differences between CIDE and IVCon:
• CIDE displays code assigned to a feature f as black text on the background color of f .
For code that implements multiple features, CIDE displays a background color equal to the
chromatic blending of the colors of all features being implemented. This design relies on
a user’s ability to decompose any displayed background color b into the feature colors that
combined to produce b, a challenging task when many feature colors exist (some of which may
even be similar to combinations of other feature colors). IVCon attempts to avoid this problem
by displaying all multi-concern code in a distinctive but uniform manner; users determine
exactly which concerns multi-concern code implements by looking in either a separate panel
or a tooltip.
• The granularity of feature assignment in CIDE is coarser than the granularity of concern
assignment in IVCon. CIDE allows users to assign concerns at the grammatical level of nodes
in abstract syntax trees (ASTs), rather than at the lexical level of tokens. Every AST node
is a valid sequence of tokens, but there are an infinite number of token sequences that are
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not AST nodes (e.g., standard grammars would not have AST nodes for token sequences
like methodName(, methodName(paramExpr1, methodName(paramExpr1, paramExpr2, etc).
Token-level granularity is significantly more expressive than AST-node granularity.
• Because CIDE requires that any set of features can be composed to create a legal program,
CIDE users can only assign code segments to features when those segments are optional
according to the language’s syntax. IVCon lacks the ability to create a valid program by
selecting an arbitrary set of concerns to include in the program; therefore, IVCon has no
need for restricting concern code to syntactically optional segments. For example, an IVCon
user could assign the constant in the statement pi=3.14 to a constants concern (to enable
viewing and editing all the program’s constants in a single module in the unwoven view), but
such an assignment is impossible in CIDE because the constant is not syntactically optional.
• By specifying a program to contain exactly one feature, CIDE users can view that one feature
isolated from the others (but not isolated from the core program code). However, as with
Aspect-jEdit, CIDE displays syntactically equal code implementing the same feature multiple
times, so CIDE users cannot modify all identical feature code at once in a central module.
Most of these differences arise naturally from the distinct objectives of CIDE and IVCon: CIDE
(and related technologies such as Software Plans [28]) focuses on constructing software as a set of
features, while IVCon focuses on creating, viewing, and modifying CCCs in isolation (as well as in
the regular, woven view of the code).
Finally, we note that although IVCon is closely related to AOPLs due to its emphasis on
modularizing and refactoring concern code, IVCon could not be considered an AOPL tool according
to Filman and Friedman’s definition of AOPLs [29]. Filman and Friedman specify two necessary
properties of AOPLs, obliviousness and quantification. IVCon’s woven view is not oblivious because
it requires a programmer to document concerns directly in the body of the code. Also, IVCon does
not satisfy the quantification condition because it does not let users define joinpoints (i.e., IVCon
regions) as conditions on the program’s control flow. Allowing IVCon users to define joinpoints as
conditions on control flow could lead to ambiguous order of execution when weaving concern code
into the core; disambiguating concern-code execution ordering would require some mechanism for
specifying concern-code precedence, which would complicate IVCon’s design. Nonetheless, IVCon’s
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lack of obliviousness and quantification does not necessarily prevent it from being used as a basis
for standard AOP technologies, given that previous work has shown how to build an (oblivious and
quantified) AOPL on top of an unoblivious and unquantified aspect language [30].
1.3 A Location-based Policy-specification Language
As mentioned in Section 1.1, traditional modularization techniques work well under the assump-
tion that code being modularized implements functionally orthogonal crosscutting concerns such
as security, auditing etc. To examine this claim further, we have designed and implemented
LoPSiL, which is a policy-specification language for mobile devices [31, 32]. Policy-specification
languages are intended to simplify the process of specifying and implementing policies and typically
they operate by statically rewriting an application so that the modified application satisfies input
policies at runtime.
Ensuring a secure environment on mobile devices has gained a lot of attention with the release
of open mobile-computing platforms such as Android, iPhone, and Windows Phone 7. Before their
release, phone manufacturers were mostly solely responsible for developing software for phones.
However, with the advent of these platforms, a significantly larger set of people are now developing
software for phones. Coupled with the fact that phones now have significantly increased computing
powers, users need to treat and secure their phones like they would their computers. However,
most users tend to ignore this, which in turn, makes it easier for a malicious user to gain unautho-
rized access to a users phone and sensitive information stored in the phone. Additionally, many
programmers developing applications for these open-mobile platforms might not test their appli-
cations comprehensively enough to be able to guarantee no (or at least minimal) security holes.
Thus, even when a software developers intent may be good, it does not necessarily translate into
secure software.
As a result, we have designed and implemented a policy-specification language called LoPSiL
that:
• Allows users to specify generic policies: Because our language is Turing-complete, program-
mers can specify policies that are a strict superset of access-control (safety) policies.
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• Enables users to conveniently enforce location-based constraints in their software: To ensure
that LoPSiL caters to mobile platforms, we have built-in location constructs and included
libraries in LoPSiL that enable manipulation of location information (e.g., computing contain-
ment within a region, determining a user’s velocity etc.), so that users can more conveniently
express location-based conditions in policies.
At its core, LoPSiL uses aspects for policies (although programmers specify policies in the form
of Java class files) and AspectJ’s compiler as its rewriter.
1.3.1 Related Work
There are several policy-specification languages and policy frameworks that are related to
LoPSiL, which we next discuss. Table 1.2 summarizes this discussion.
1.3.1.1 General Policy-specification Languages
A rich variety of policy-specification languages and systems has been implemented, which enable
users to centrally specify security and privacy policies to be enforced on untrusted software at
runtime. Ponder [33], XACML [34], PoET/PSLang [2], Naccio [3], Polymer [4], and Deeds [35]
are examples of expressive (i.e., Turing-complete) policy-specification languages. However, none of
these languages provide users with built-in constructs for manipulating location information.
1.3.1.2 Formal Languages
SpatialP is a Turing-complete language in which policies can make decisions about a pro-
gram’s actions based on the location of the user [36]. However, users can specify only equality
and containment conditions on locations, so SpatialP users can manipulate location information in
only limited ways. For example, users cannot specify conditions that capture their being within
a certain distance of a fixed point. Thus, SpatialP cannot be used to specify policies such as
the DeviationFromPath and SocialNetworking (shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.4, and discussed in
Section 4.2.1). Also, as far as we are aware, SpatialP does not have an implementation.
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Table 1.2. Comparison of policy-specification languages.
Language
Provides
Turing
Allows flexible Provides
location
complete
manipulation of policy
constructs location information composition
Ponder -
√
- -
XACML - - - -
PoET/PSLang -
√
- -
Naccio -
√
- -
Polymer -
√
-
√
Deeds -
√
- -
SpatialP
√ √
- -
OpenAmbient
√
-
√
-
Geo-RBAC
√
-
√
-
Android’s built-in Security
√
-
√
-
LoPSiL
√ √ √
-
1.3.1.3 Location-based Access-control Languages
There are other policy-specification languages that do have primitives for manipulating location
information, but as far as we are aware, none of these languages are Turing-complete, which prevents
specification of arbitrary policies. For example, OpenAmbient, an access-control architecture for
web services, provides a policy-specification language in which policies can reason about location
information (as part of the system’s ambient state) but cannot maintain a state of their own [37, 38].
Not being able to maintain state prevents policies from (1) basing decisions on previous policy
actions and (2) executing arbitrary code in response to application actions. For these reasons,
it would be impossible to specify the DeviationFromPath and SocialNetworking policies using
OpenAmbient.
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Another location-based but Turing-incomplete policy-specification language is Geo-RBAC [39].
The Turing-incompleteness of Geo-RBAC derives from its targeting only RBAC (role-based access-
control) policies, which are safety policies and therefore a proper subset of the policies enforceable
at runtime [40]. In addition, role assignment and location information are fixed per session in
Geo-RBAC, so policies on systems with dynamically changing roles or locations (e.g., the policies
in Figures 4.2–4.4) could not be specified with Geo-RBAC.
Ray and Kumar describe a formal, Turing-incomplete model that extends a MAC system with
location primitives [41]. They describe how the location of a subject and an object can be used to
make decisions about granting subjects access to objects, while keeping the locations of subjects
and objects private from each other. However, because their model is an access-control (safety
policy) model, users cannot specify policies such as DeviationFromPath and SocialNetworking.
1.3.1.4 Android’s Built-in Security Mechanism
The Android operating system enforces mandatory access-control in Android applications [42,
43]. Users specify, in an XML manifest file, permissions that mediate both incoming and outgoing
requests pertaining to the various components of their application (i.e., users have to specify re-
sources that their application will access, and services that can access the users’ application). Users
can also specify policies that run arbitrary code to decide whether permission to a resource should
be granted or not; this is achieved by modifying a method called checkPermission(). Also, be-
cause Android provides users with primitives to manipulate location information, users can utilize
these primitives in the checkPermission() method to specify location-based access-control poli-
cies. However, the Android security framework does not enable users to specify and enforce runtime
policies, so the existing framework in Android can not be used to intercept user actions and decide
whether or not to allow those actions to be executed. As a result, Android’s built-in enforcement
system is limited to access-control policies and therefore similarly to Geo-RBAC and the model of
Ray and Kumar, cannot enforce more general runtime policies such as DeviationFromPath and
SocialNetworking.
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1.4 Contributions
The first part of this thesis discusses the modularization of crosscutting concerns using IVCon,
an IDE that enabling users to flexibly assign concerns in their code by allowing users to explicitly
assign different parts of their code to the concern(s) that they implement. IVCon differs from
existing concern-management tools by providing a combination of (1) translations between woven
and unwoven views (2) many-to-many relationships between concerns and code, (3) isolating con-
cern code in the unwoven view, (4) centrally modifying identical concern code, and (5) token-level
granularity in concern assignment.
Thereafter, we discuss the modularization of runtime security policies using LoPSiL, a policy-
specification language that uses aspects to modularize security implementations. As far as we are
aware, LoPSiL is the first Turing-complete language that provides language constructs that enable
users to manipulate location information conveniently.
This thesis derives from our earlier work [44, 31, 45, 46, 47, 48, 32], but ties it together to
present a complete treatment to the modularization of CCCs in software. More specifically, this
thesis extends previous work by answering the following questions:
• How a dual view of software and the ability for programmers to define multi-concern code
aids software comprehension, and how these features help during the process of software
maintenance?
• Whether or not, the benefits achieved by using dual views of software and multi-concern code
can be achieved within reasonable overheads, in terms of a user’s effort?
• How suitable are traditional modularization constructs (i.e., methods, classes, and aspects)
for modularizing code that implements multiple concerns? Additionally, how suitable are the
same constructs for modularizing functionally orthogonal concern code?
• What kind of language constructs are useful for policies that reason about a program’s exe-
cution based on a system’s location? More specifically, does our language (LoPSiL) provide
useful constructs for specifying such policies?
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• What kind of policies would be useful to specify and implement in a language that enables
users to specify location-based policies? Furthermore, how convenient is it to specify those
policies in LoPSiL?
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the user interface and imple-
mentation details of our prototype of IVCon, Chapter 3 discusses the modularization of runtime
policies along with implementation details of our proof-of-concept LoPSiL compiler, Chapter 4 dis-
cusses the validity of our approach by outlining our experiences working with IVCon and LoPSiL,
and an analysis of their performance overheads, and Chapter 5 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
AN IMPLEMENTATION OF IVCON
This chapter describes the user interface and implementation details of our prototype imple-
mentation of IVCon.
2.1 User Interface
IVCon displays code in two different but equivalent forms: the woven view (Figure 2.1) and
the unwoven view (Figure 2.2). Users can translate their code between the two views simply by
selecting the weave or unweave menu options, or by pressing <ctrl-w> or <ctrl-u>.
2.1.1 Woven View
In the woven view, shown in Figure 2.1, users can write code as they normally would in a
standard text editor or development environment. In addition, users can define concerns, associate
a color with each concern, and highlight and explicitly assign code segments to concerns (by right-
clicking highlighted code and selecting the concern to which to assign it). Upon assigning a code
segment to a concern, IVCon recolors the assigned code to match the concern it implements. IVCon
displays code assigned to multiple concerns in white text on a dark background, though users are
free to change this multi-concern background color.
By highlighting a contiguous code segment and assigning it to a concern, a user defines a region
in the code. Every region starts at the beginning of code assigned to a concern and extends as far
as the code does that implements that concern. Multiple concerns can share the same region if
code implementing those concerns begins and ends at exactly the same positions in the program
file. Although IVCon requires a user-specified name for every unique region a user defines, it
always provides a default name for regions based on the name of the concern to which the region is
being assigned. Default region names provided by IVCon are of the format region concernname i,
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Figure 2.1. IVCon’s woven view of the same code shown in Figure 2.2.
where i is the number of regions that have been previously defined for the concern concernname.
For example, if a user has defined three regions for the security concern in a file, the default
name that IVCon provides for the next region that gets assigned to the security concern would be
region security 3. Also, if a previously defined region gets assigned to a new concern, IVCon
simply reuses the existing region name. Specifying names for regions helps users understand where
subconcerns are implemented, as discussed in Section 2.1.2.
Figure 2.1 shows the woven-view window divided into three panels: concerns legend, woven
body, and concerns at current position.
• The concerns-legend panel lists all the user-defined concerns in the current file. IVCon displays
the name of each concern in the color associated with that concern.
• The woven-body panel contains user code displayed in colors that indicate concern assign-
ments.
• The concerns-at-current-position panel lists the concern(s) implemented by the code at the
current cursor position.
Apart from creating and modifying code, defining concerns, and assigning code to concerns,
users can edit concern names, edit concern colors, remove concerns, de-assign code from concerns,
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Figure 2.2. IVCon’s unwoven view of the same code shown in Figure 2.1.
change the multi-concern background, rename regions, and open, save, and close files in the woven
view.
2.1.2 Unwoven View
The unwoven view, shown in Figure 2.2, displays the program core and each concern in isolation.
The unwoven-view window is the same as the woven-view window, except that the unwoven-view
divides the woven-body panel into two subpanels: unwoven body and unwoven concerns.
• The unwoven-body panel displays the core of the program. Code that has been assigned to one
or more concerns is extracted (into the unwoven-concerns panel) and replaced by holes (2) of
the same color as the extracted code. Every contiguous code segment that has been assigned
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Figure 2.3. Concern-module formatting in IVCon.
to the same set of concerns gets replaced by one hole (explained further in Section 2.2.2.1).
Thus, holes in the unwoven-body panel indicate extracted concern code.
• The unwoven-concerns panel displays in isolation each of the program’s concerns (as extracted
from the unwoven body). Each concern is divided into subconcerns, which are syntactically
different code segments assigned to the same concern. IVCon displays subconcerns in two
parts: a list of the regions in which the subconcern appears and then the subconcern code
itself. As an example, readers can look at Figure 2.3 to see concern modules for security
and audit concerns for the example code from Figure 2.1. On clicking any region name in
the unwoven-concerns panel, IVCon automatically focuses the unwoven-body panel to show
that region’s location in the context of the program core.
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Unwoven Body:
if (buffer.getSize() > 2)
buffer.truncate(2);
if (getTimeElapsed() > 2)
JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(frame,
"Request timed out","Error",
JOptionPane.ERROR MESSAGE);
Unwoven Concerns:
concern constant
{
subconcern @ max buffer size 0
@ max buffer size 1
§
512
§
subconcern @ timeout ms 0
§
2000
§
}
Figure 2.4. Unwoven view of the code in Figure 2.5.
Code for the security concern in Figure 2.3 indicates the presence of two subconcerns (at
regions before protected read and after protected read). The code segments beginning with
if (checkCredentials()) and accessLog.append implement those subconcerns. Similarly, code
for the audit concern indicates the presence of three subconcerns (at regions file read granted,
file read denied, and after protected read). The unwoven-concerns panel may also contain
constructs called flags (e.g., security|| and ||security), which convey information about concern as-
signment in multi-concern code segments. Section 2.1.3 provides additional explanation of IVCon
flags.
Figure 2.3 also demonstrates the usefulness of having descriptive, user-specified names for re-
gions. Descriptive region names help software engineers quickly understand where subconcern code
exists in relation to the rest of the program logic. Nonetheless, if a region name provides insufficient
contextual information, the user can always click on the name to see that region’s context in the
unwoven-body panel.
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Woven Body:
if (buffer.getSize() > 512)
buffer.truncate(512);
if (getTimeElapsed() > 2000)
JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(frame,
"Request timed out","Error",
JOptionPane.ERROR MESSAGE);
Figure 2.5. Woven view of the code in Figure 2.4.
As another example, let us consider Figure 2.4, which shows how IVCon groups into one sub-
concern all syntactically equal code assigned to the same concern. Figure 2.5 contains the woven
view of the same program. In the woven view, the user has defined a concern named constant
and has assigned the two constants 512 and 2000 to that concern (IVCon’s token-level granularity
in concern assignment enables such operations). Normally, programmers using standard software-
development tools would define these values in memory declared immutable and would always refer
to the constants’ values with variables like MAXBUFFERSIZE and TIMEOUTMS. This technique enables
the programmers to make a global change to a constant value by modifying just one central def-
inition. However, this benefit comes at the price of not being able to immediately see the values
of constants in the source code. In contrast, IVCon’s dual woven and unwoven views provide both
benefits: users can update constant values centrally (in the constant concern of the unwoven-
concerns panel) and can view the constant values directly in the source code (in the woven-body
panel). Actually, IVCon provides the added benefit that users can see (in the unwoven-concerns
panel) a region-name reference to every use of every constant and can click any of those region
names to see the context of that use in the unwoven-body panel. Of course, this example is just a
special case of the general use of IVCon to provide both a global (i.e., woven) view of the code and
a concern-specific (i.e., unwoven) view of the same code.
IVCon’s unwoven view allows users to create and edit core-program code (in the unwoven-
body panel) and concern code (in the unwoven-concerns panel). To avoid ambiguity in the weaving
algorithm (described in Section 2.2.2.2), IVCon does not allow users to delete holes in the unwoven-
body panel or to edit non-concern code (e.g., concern and region names) in the unwoven-concerns
panel.
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2.1.3 Display of Multi-concern Code
The woven view displays multi-concern code in white text over the multi-concern background,
while the concerns-at-current-position panel indicates which concern(s) the code at the current cur-
sor position implements. Similarly, the unwoven view displays multi-concern code in the unwoven-
body panel as a hole colored white over the multi-concern background, while the concerns-at-
current-position panel continues to indicate which concern(s) the hole at the current cursor position
implements.
In addition, the unwoven-concerns panel uses flags to convey information about the concerns
associated with multi-concern code (as mentioned in Section 2.1.2). Flags serve as a quick reference
for visualizing where overlapping concerns begin and end. To illustrate the use of flags, consider
the code in Figure 2.2 that implements the security concern at region before protected read.
In the woven view (Figure 2.1), we assigned this code segment to the security concern, and we
assigned the two nested statements beginning with accessLog.append to the audit concern. As
a result, the unwoven-concerns panel in Figure 2.2 displays green flags (audit||) and red flags(||audit)
to indicate the nesting of audit-concern code within the security-concern code.
Green and red flags within the unwoven-concerns panel indicate the beginning and ending of
overlapping concerns. Green and red flags do not always appear together within a subconcern;
depending on the overlap between concern regions, there may be a green flag only, a red flag only,
both green and red flags, or no flags at all within subconcern code. Also, multiple red and green
flags of the same concern, or multiple flags of various concerns, may be present within a subconcern.
The syntax of code in IVCon’s unwoven-concerns panel includes flags, so two subconcerns are
syntactically equal if and only if the text of those two subconcerns—including flags within the
subconcerns—is the same. Thus, the subconcern accessLog.append(‘‘File read complete.’’)
is not syntactically equal to security||accessLog.append(‘‘File read complete.
’’)||security. This distinction matters because, as described in Section 2.1.2, syntactically equal
subconcerns are grouped together in the unwoven-concerns panel. If IVCon did not consider
flags when testing for concern-code equality, it would group both accessLog.append(‘‘File read
complete.’’) and security||accessLog. append(‘‘File read complete.’’)||security
into a single subconcern, but the presence or absence of security flags in such a subconcern would
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be confusing because one of the instances of this subconcern has a nested security region, while the
other does not.
2.2 Implementation Details
We have implemented a prototype of IVCon in Java; the source code is online [49]. The core
IVCon application consists of 7961 lines of code (18 classes in 15 files), of which 7788 implement
the GUI and 173 implement backend data structures. IVCon also uses several third-party libraries
(e.g., clipboard and lexical-analysis libraries) for auxiliary functions.
2.2.1 Data Structures
IVCon maintains three key data structures.
• A regionMap is a hash table that maps a numerical region identifier (needed for the RTree
implementation described below) to that region’s user-visible name, beginning and ending
positions for the region, and a list of the concerns to which the region has been assigned.
• A concernMap is a hash table that maps a unique concern name to that concern’s display
color and a list of the regions assigned to that concern.
• A regionTree is an RTree, a dynamic structure for storing data about potentially overlapping
regions in space [50, 51]. When queried about a particular region r, an RTree can efficiently
return the set of stored regions that overlap r. RTrees are ideal data structures for IVCon
because they enable efficient querying to determine which regions are defined at a given
character position in the source file (e.g., at the position of the cursor or within a newly
defined region). Once IVCon determines which regions are present at a given position, it can
use the regionMap to look up all the concerns assigned to those regions. IVCon uses this
look-up operation while weaving and unweaving code, and while displaying concerns in the
concerns-at-current-position panel.
Together these structures enable reasonable performance in all of IVCon’s core operations.
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2.2.2 Translation Algorithms
Given a regionMap, concernMap, and regionTree, it is generally straightforward to implement
the translations between woven and unwoven views.
2.2.2.1 Unweaving
Unweaving is the process of translating a woven-view program into an equivalent unwoven-view
program.
Unweaving in IVCon begins with lexical analysis to enforce token-level granularity in concern
assignment. After lexical analysis, IVCon starts with the woven code in the unwoven-body panel
and iterates through all concerns in the concernMap, extracting the code in all of that concern’s
regions from the unwoven-body panel to the unwoven-concerns panel. Extracted concern code gets
replaced with holes (2) of the appropriate color in the unwoven-body panel. During the extraction
process, IVCon groups concern code into syntactically equal subconcerns in the unwoven-concerns
panel and displays isolated concerns in the format described in Section 2.1.2.
Although the unweaving algorithm just described is straightforward, one interesting issue arose
during implementation. The issue concerns how to display holes in place of overlapping, but
unequal, regions. For example, let us reconsider the woven-body code of Figure 2.1. In that figure,
a programmer has assigned an entire if statement to the security concern and has nested two
audit-concern regions within that security region. There are two reasonable alternatives for
unweaving this if statement:
• We could replace the entire if statement with one hole of the multi-concern color to indicate
that one region of code, which in total implements multiple concerns, has been extracted.
• We could replace the entire if statement with five holes that alternate between the security-
concern color and the multi-concern color, to indicate that the extracted code first contains
security-concern code, then some multi-concern code, then more security-concern code, and
so on.
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Because it provides more precise concern-assignment information, we implemented the second of
these alternatives in IVCon. Figure 2.2 shows the resulting five-hole concern extraction in the
unwoven-body panel.
2.2.2.2 Weaving
Weaving is the process of translating an unwoven-view program into an equivalent woven-view
program. To weave, IVCon builds the woven body from the unwoven body by iterating through all
the holes in the unwoven body and filling in each hole with the appropriate concern code.
While designing the weaving algorithm, one interesting issue arose, which relates to filling
multi-concern holes with code. Because a code segment that fills in a multi-concern hole has been
assigned to multiple concerns, it appears in multiple places in the unwoven-concerns panel. The
interesting issue occurs when the user modifies multi-concern code in one place but not another in
the unwoven-concern panel. Such a modification leads to code inconsistencies when filling multi-
concern holes (i.e., which one of the concern modules should be used for filling a multi-concern
hole). To ensure that such code inconsistencies do not occur, we have implemented linked editing
in the unwoven-concerns panel [52]. Code segments in the unwoven-concerns panel that fill in the
same (multi-concern) hole get linked at runtime, so any changes made in one code location get
reflected immediately in all the other code locations that fill in the same hole.
2.2.3 Third-party Libraries
IVCon also uses several libraries and code that we downloaded from third-party sources:
• RTrees: IVCon use RTrees (as mentioned earlier in Section 2.2.1) to efficiently determine
what concerns are assigned to a particular point in a user’s program. We researched other
spatial data structures such as the P-R Tree [51], IBS Tree [53] and skip lists [54]. However,
we had a problem finding a correct implementation of the P-R Tree; IBS Tree and skip lists
were not suited to our purpose because they do not allow dynamic addition or deletion of
intervals, which is important for IVCon as users define regions dynamically. IVCon uses
Hadjieleftheriou’s implementation of RTrees [55].
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• JavaCC: IVCon also uses JavaCC, a Java-based parser generator, which is available on-
line [56]. JavaCC’s downloadable package includes several grammars, including that of Java.
By modifying the grammar files for Java, we were able to generate a Java lexer, which we use
in our weaving and unweaving algorithms to verify the lexical validity of user programs and
to enforce token-level granularity.
• Clipboard: IVCon uses a third-party clipboard implementation to implement the cut, copy,
and paste functionalities in all of IVCon’s user-editable panels (i.e., woven-body, unwoven-
body, and concerns-at-current-position panels) [57].
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CHAPTER 3
MODULARIZING RUNTIME SECURITY POLICIES
In order to prevent malicious activity on computers, programmers have to ensure that their
software behaves in ways that it is intended to. Malicious users often exploit security holes in a
system’s implementation to gain unauthorized access to computers or to execute malicious code on
computers. For example, a malicious user can exploit the weak type-safety of a weakly-typed or
type-unsafe language to launch a buffer-overflow attack on a system implemented in that language.
However, by incorporating security checks at appropriate places in their code, users can avoid such
attacks. For example, to counter the buffer-overflow attack mentioned above, a user would precede
every instance of a memory-access with code that ensures that the memory is accessed in safe
ways. However, such security checks often become scattered across a software’s implementation,
and thereby tedious to maintain.
To ensure that security checks do not get scattered, security engineers modularize such security
checks into policies using policy-specification languages. Policy-specification languages are domain-
specific programming languages intended to simplify the tasks of specifying and enforcing sound
security policies on untrusted (i.e., potentially insecure) software. Typically, these languages are
implemented as compilers that convert untrusted into trustworthy applications by inputting a policy
P and an application program A and outputting a new application program A′ equivalent to A,
except that A′ contains inlined enforcement code that ensures that A′ satisfies P at runtime.
Policy-specification languages enable users to specify policies centrally and provide users with
all other modularization benefits (i.e., they make security code easy to read, understand, and main-
tain). Traditional modularization techniques that do not capture the multi-concern nature of code
can be used to modularize security policies because in most applications, security is functionally
orthogonal to the rest of the code.
29
In this chapter, we discuss the modularization of runtime policies using LoPSiL, a policy-
specification language that we have implemented, which as far as we know, is the first Turing-
complete policy-specification language that provides users with language constructs that help
users to conveniently manipulate location information. LoPSiL is short for Location-based Policy-
specification Language. We start with a discussion of LoPSiL’s linguistic constructs and use an
elementary policy to show how policies are implemented in LoPSiL. Thereafter, we describe the
implementation of our proof-of-concept LoPSiL compiler.
3.1 LoPSiL
Due to the popularity of Java, particularly Java ME, as an application programming language
for mobile devices [58], we have chosen to design and implement LoPSiL constructs in Java source
code. Also, to make it easy for security engineers to learn and use LoPSiL, and to simplify the
implementation of a LoPSiL compiler, we have packaged LoPSiL as a Java library, to which LoPSiL
policies may refer (e.g., a LoPSiL policy may refer to the Location class in the LoPSiL library).
Although we treat LoPSiL in a Java context in this paper, we have built LoPSiL on six core
abstractions that are application-language independent, so we expect LoPSiL to be portable to
other languages and platforms.
3.1.1 Core Linguistic Constructs
LoPSiL is built on six core abstractions; we describe each in turn.
• Locations: In LoPSiL, Locations are (possibly abstract) places. They may refer to rooms,
chairs, floors, buildings, campuses, GPS coordinates, regions of a network topology, etc. All
Locations have an identity (e.g., a room or building name, or coordinates in GPS). LoPSiL
provides many built-in utility methods for manipulating GPS locations (e.g., to calculate
distances between them), as the examples in Section 4.2.1 demonstrate. However, LoPSiL
users are always free to implement custom methods for manipulating locations (e.g., to define
a containment relation over locations, useful for testing whether a room is in a building, a
building is on a campus, etc).
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• LocationDevices: A LocationDevice is LoPSiL’s interface to real-time location information.
Concrete LocationDevices must implement two abstract methods. The first simply informs
policies of the device’s current location, which could be determined using GPS or by inputting
location information from a user, a file, another (networked) host, a TLTA device [59], etc.
The second abstract method LocationDevices must implement informs LoPSiL policies of the
device’s granularity, that is, with what precision is the device’s location information accurate
(e.g., accurate within 1 meter, 1 room, 1 road, 1 building, 1 kilometer, etc). LoPSiL policies
can require devices to provide location information with particular granularity thresholds.
Our LoPSiL implementation includes concrete implementations of two LocationDevices, but
users are always free to implement others. The first LocationDevice provided with LoPSiL
represents and connects to a Garmin GPS device using Java’s communication API and the
GPSLib4J library [60]; the second LocationDevice represents and connects to a simple GUI
with which users can manually select their current location from a list of known locations.
• PolicyAssumptions: LoPSiL policies may make two important assumptions about
LocationDevices. First, as mentioned above, a policy may require location information
with a particular granularity (e.g., accurate within 15m). Second, a policy may require that
location updates arrive with a particular frequency (e.g., a new update must arrive within
10s of the previous update). LoPSiL policies encapsulate these assumptions, along with
the LocationDevices whose location data they trust, in a PolicyAssumptions object. A
LoPSiL policy gets notified automatically whenever a LocationDevice violates the policy’s
granularity or frequency-of-updates assumptions.
• Actions: An Action encapsulates information about a security-relevant method (i.e., any
Java application or library method of relevance to a LoPSiL policy). LoPSiL policies can
interpose before and after any security-relevant action executes; the policy specification then
determines whether that action is allowed to execute. Policies may analyze Action objects
to determine which security-relevant method the action represents, that method’s signature,
run-time arguments, and calling object (if one exists), whether the method is about to execute
or has just finished executing, and the return value of the action if it has finished executing.
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• Reactions: LoPSiL policies convey decisions about whether to allow security-relevant Actions
to execute by returning, for every Action object, a Reaction object. AnOK reaction indicates
that the action is safe to execute; an exception reaction indicates that the action is unsafe,
so an exception should be raised (which the application may catch) instead of allowing the
method to execute; a replace reaction indicates that the action is unsafe, so a precomputed
return value should be returned to the application in place of executing the unsafe action;
and a halt reaction indicates that the action is unsafe, so the application program should be
halted.
• Policies: LoPSiL policies incorporate all of the previously described language constructs.
There are five parts to a LoPSiL Policy object:
– A policy may declare PolicyAssumptions upon which it relies.
– A policy may define a handleGranularityViolation method, which will be invoked
whenever all LocationDevices upon which the policy relies violate the policy’s location-
granularity assumption.
– A policy may define a handleFrequencyViolationmethod, which will be invoked when-
ever all LocationDevices upon which the policy relies violate the policy’s frequency-of-
update assumption. LoPSiL’s PolicyAssumptions class implements the multithreading
needed to test for frequency-of-update violations.
– A policy may define an onLocationUpdate method, which will be executed any time
any LocationDevice associated with the policy updates its Location information. This
method enables a policy to update its security state and take other actions as location
updates occur in real time.
– A policy must define a react method to indicate how to react to any security-relevant
method. LoPSiL requires every policy to contain a react method, rather than providing
a default allow-all react method; hence, policy authors wanting to allow all security-
relevant methods to execute unconditionally must explicitly specify their policy to do
so.
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public class AllowAll extends Policy {
public LocationDevice[] devices = {new LopsilGPS(LopsilGPS.GARMIN)};
public LocationGranularityAssumption lga =
new LocationGranularityAssumption(15, Units.METERS);
public FrequencyOfUpdatesAssumption foua =
new FrequencyOfUpdatesAssumption(10, Units.SECONDS);
public PolicyAssumptions pa =
new PolicyAssumptions(this, devices, lga, foua);
public void handleGranularityViolation() {System.exit(1);}
public void handleFrequencyViolation() {System.exit(1);}
public synchronized void onLocationUpdate() {
System.out.println("new location = " + devices[0].getLocation());
}
public synchronized Reaction react(Action a) {
return new Reaction("ok");
}
}
Figure 3.1. Simple LoPSiL Policy that allow all actions to execute
3.1.2 Example LoPSiL Policy
Figure 3.1 contains a simple LoPSiL policy called the AllowAll policy that contains all five
of the components illustrated in the previous section. The AllowAll policy prints location in-
formation as it is updated, and allows all security-relevant methods to execute, as long as its
location-granularity and frequency-of-update assumptions are not violated. We describe several
other policies implemented in LoPSiL in Section 4.2.1.
Existing policy-specification languages, such as Naccio [3], PSLang [2], and Polymer [4, 5],
provide constructs similar to our Actions, Reactions, and Policy modules with react-style meth-
ods. LoPSiL’s novelty is its addition of optional location-related policy components: Locations,
LocationDevices, granularity and frequency-of-update assumptions, and methods to handle gran-
ularity and frequency-of-update violations and to take action when location state gets updated
(with the onLocationUpdate method).
3.2 A LoPSiL Compiler
This section describes our implementation of LoPSiL and briefly reports on our experiences
designing and implementing LoPSiL policies. The implementations of LoPSiL’s basic Location,
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void java.io.PrintStream.println(..)
* javax.swing.JOptionPane.*(..)
java.util.Date.new()
Figure 3.2. Example .srm file indicating that the accompanying LoPSiL policy considers se-
curity relevant all void-returning java.io.PrintStream.println methods, all methods in the
javax.swing.JOptionPane class, and the parameterless constructor for java.util.Dates.
LocationDevice, Action, Reaction, and Policy modules occupy 1588 lines of Java code, while
the implementations of our GarminGpsDevice and LopsilWindowDevice respectively occupy 847
and 107 lines of Java code. Our implementation is available online [61].
3.2.1 Compiler Architecture
A LoPSiL compiler needs to input a LoPSiL policy and an untrusted application, build a
trustworthy application by inserting code into the untrusted application to enforce the input policy,
and then output the trustworthy application. The standard technique for implementing such a
compiler involves inlining policy code into the untrusted application. Several tools exist for inlining
code into an application; a convenient tool for our purposes is an AspectJ compiler [62]. AspectJ
compilers inline calls to advice at control-flow points specified by point cuts. In the domain of
runtime policy enforcement, advice refers to policy-enforcement code and point cuts to the set of
security-relevant methods. We wish to interpose and allow policy-enforcement code to execute
before and after any security-relevant method invoked by the untrusted application.
LoPSiL users convert an untrusted application into a trustworthy application as follows.
• The user creates a specification of the desired policy in a .lopsil file.
• The user also creates a listing of all the methods the desired LoPSiL policy considers security
relevant. This listing indicates to the compiler which application and library methods it needs
to insert policy-enforcement code around. Policies get to interpose and decide whether (and
how) all security-relevant methods may execute. The listing of security-relevant methods goes
into a .srm file, one method signature per line. Figure 3.2 contains an example and illustrates
how wildcards can be used in .srm files.
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LoPSiL policy (.lopsil)
Security-relevant 
methods (.srm)
Untrusted 
application (.class)
lopsil2aj
converter
Policy-enforcement code (.java)
AspectJ pointcut definition for
security-relevant methods (.aj)
AspectJ
compiler
Trustworthy
application (.class)
LoPSiL Compiler
Figure 3.3. Overview of the LoPSiL compiler.
• The LoPSiL compiler inputs the policy (.lopsil) and security-relevant-methods (.srm) into
a lopsil2aj converter, which converts LoPSiL code into AspectJ code. The converter, im-
plemented in 201 lines of Java, begins by converting the LoPSiL policy to Java source (in a
.java file) by simply inserting three lines of code to import LoPSiL-library classes into the
policy. The converter then creates an AspectJ-code file (.aj) that defines two things. First,
the AspectJ code defines a point cut based on the declared security-relevant methods. Second,
the AspectJ code defines advice to be executed whenever the point cut gets triggered (i.e.,
before and after any security-relevant method executes). This advice builds an Action object
to represent the invoked security-relevant method, passes that Action to the LoPSiL policy
(now in a .java file), obtains the policy’s Reaction to the Action, and guides execution
appropriately based on that Reaction.
• Finally, the LoPSiL compiler inputs the untrusted mobile-device application (comprised of a
set of .class files) and the .java and .aj files created in Step 3 into a standard AspectJ
compiler [62]. The AspectJ compiler inlines the advice into the application before and after
all security-relevant methods, thus producing an application that is secure with respect to
the original LoPSiL policy.
Figure 3.3 presents an overview of this architecture.
Because LoPSiL uses AspectJ as its application rewriter, LoPSiL inherits AspectJ’s limitations.
Most importantly, the AspectJ compiler cannot rewrite (i.e., inline code into) methods in standard
Java libraries; it can only rewrite application files. Therefore, our LoPSiL compiler can only ensure
that policy-enforcement code executes before and after security-relevant methods invoked by the
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application being monitored. The important consequence is that our implementation does not allow
enforcement mechanisms to interpose and make decisions about the execution of library methods
invoked by other library methods.
We have also implemented LoPSiL on the Android platform [42]1. The Android implementation
is available online [63] along with details about our experiences with porting LoPSiL to the Android
platform, and the various overheads induced by using LoPSiL on a mobile system that is memory-
and battery-constrained [32].
1We thank Joshua Finnis for the Android implementation of LoPSiL.
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CHAPTER 4
VALIDATION OF APPROACH
This chapter describes our experiences working with IVCon and LoPSiL, along with evaluating
the performance overhead of the two.
4.1 IVCon
To validate our proposed approach to the modularization of CCCs, we performed case studies
and performance tests to confirm, 1) to what extent IVCon provides software engineering benefits,
and 2) does IVCon perform its various operations in reasonable amounts of time. This section
describes those case studies and performance tests.
4.1.1 Case Studies
To improve our understanding of IVCon’s software engineering advantages and disadvantages,
we used IVCon to extend several applications, including IVCon itself.
4.1.1.1 Extending IVCon
Our first case study involved extending IVCon with the following features:
• Search for text in code. This serves a feature similar to <ctrl-f> in common editors.
• Jump to a particular line number of code specified by the user. This helps users debug, as
compilers typically report warnings and errors by line number.
• Open multiple files simultaneously. This enables users to build projects that span multiple
files, with the ability for concerns to crosscut multiple files.
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• Show in a tool-tip the concerns implemented by the code that the mouse pointer points to.
This enables users to see which concerns a code segment S implements without actually
moving the cursor to S.
• Integrate linked editing in the unwoven-concerns panel. This ensures that there are no
code inconsistencies when filling in multi-concern holes during weaving (as mentioned in
Section 2.2.2.2).
• View flags in the woven view. This provides users with the same clarity of concern assignment
in the woven view that currently exists in the unwoven view. Because concern assignments
also serve as code documentation, this feature can improve users’ comprehension of woven-
view code. In addition, because flags stand out well from the rest of the code, this feature
helps users quickly locate code assigned to particular concerns.
• Jump to a specified concern module in the unwoven-concerns panel. This enables users to
easily navigate in the unwoven-concerns panel.
• Compile and execute code directly from IVCon. This saves users from having to switch to
external tools for compilation and execution.
After implementing each of these features, we recompiled IVCon and worked in the newer
version to implement the next feature. This bootstrapping approach ensured that we could draw
the benefits of each new feature while implementing subsequent features.
As shown in Figure 4.1, implementing the case study entailed adding 1591 lines of code to our
initial IVCon prototype. The total time spent implementing the case-study features was 45 hours
and 13 minutes, out of which we spent 27 minutes and 31 seconds defining and assigning code to
concerns. Hence, 1.03% of the total design and implementation time involved performing overhead
actions necessary to reap IVCon’s benefits (of creating, viewing, and editing code in both woven
and unwoven views). The code assigned to concerns in the case study occupied 125 regions, which
we assigned to 43 concerns. Taken together, these data show that our case study was a practical,
medium-sized implementation effort (about one work week of time), and only a small portion (about
one percent) of the implementation time had to be spent defining and assigning code to concerns.
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Table 4.1. Implementation effort for IVCon case study.
Feature implemented
Number of Time spent
Lines of Time spent times used defining and
code implementing weaving assigning code
added (hr:min) and to concerns
unweaving (hr:min)
Find text 57 03:14 11 00:07
Goto line 41 00:48 7 00:00
Multiple files (projects) 446 10:09 79 00:03
Tool tips 53 01:44 8 00:05
Linked editing 364 15:39 93 00:09
Flags in the woven view 346 09:43 108 00:01
Jump to a concern 81 00:43 4 00:00
Compile and execute 203 03:41 15 00:03
Total 1591 45:41 325 00:28
4.1.1.2 Extending JHotDraw and Java Scientific Calculator
We also used IVCon to extend other programmers’ projects: JHotDraw [8] and the Java Scien-
tific Calculator [64]. JHotDraw is a framework, implemented in approximately 33,000 lines of Java
code, for developing graphics editors. The Java Scientific Calculator is implemented in approxi-
mately 25,000 lines of code.
We added the following features:
• To JHotDraw we added a feature for asking users, before exiting the program without saving
changes to open files, whether they wish to save those changes.
• To the Java Scientific Calculator we added:
– Three extra memory slots to the calculator, which in its original version had only one
memory slot.
– Grades as a unit for measuring angles (to complement degrees and radians).
– A button that, when pressed, displays the modulus of a complex number.
Table 4.2 summarizes our implementation effort for these additional case studies. Defining and
assigning code to concerns consumed about 1.59% of the total implementation time, up from the
1.03% overhead we found in the first case study. We attribute the increased overhead to the extra
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Table 4.2. Implementation effort for JHotDraw and Java Scientific Calculator case studies.
Feature implemented
Number of Time spent
Lines of Time spent times used defining and
code implementing weaving assigning code
added (hr:min) and to concerns
unweaving (hr:min)
JHotDraw
Ask to save files 256 07:42 42 00:07
Java Scientific Calculator
Additional memory slots 542 04:41 18 00:05
Grade angle unit 10 00:54 4 00:01
Mod of complex numbers 43 01:25 12 00:01
Total 851 14:42 76 00:14
effort required for figuring out which concerns are being implemented in code written by another
programmer. The 1.59% overhead is still low and was achieved while defining and assigning code
to several concerns; we found it useful to define 8 concerns in 18 regions throughout 5 JHotDraw
files, and 10 concerns in 27 regions throughout 19 Java Scientific Calculator files.
4.1.2 Experiential Observations
While adding new features to IVCon, IVCon aided code production in several ways, by pro-
viding all the benefits outlined in Sections 1.4 and 2.1, as well as the bootstrapped benefits
listed in Section 4.1.1.1. Assigning all code implementing each of the case-study features to a
feature-specific concern was a significant aid when locating code for each concern as it was be-
ing implemented and tested, particularly because some of the concerns (e.g., MultiFile) crosscut
several classes and methods (e.g., FileUtilities.newFile(), FileUtilities.openIvcFile(),
Windows.stateChanged(), etc). It was similarly helpful to be able to unweave other concerns
during the case study, as we frequently needed to refer to their implementations; for instance,
we also defined OpenFile, SaveFile, LexerFunctions, and RTreeFunctions concerns. Many of
the concerns we defined overlapped (e.g., MultiFile and OpenFile), so IVCon’s ability to handle
multi-concern code was helpful.
It was also useful during the case study to assign syntactically equal code segments, which
crosscut various functions, to the same concern, so we could update those code segments centrally.
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For example, while implementing the MultiFile concern, we made 9 centralized updates to 3
instances of a line of code used for switching between per-file data structures; these 9 updates
would have required 27 updates in standard code editors.
As evidence that the crosscutting and overlapping concerns we defined were natural and not
enabled by poor code organization, we ran IVCon’s woven code through Eclipse’s automatic class-
extraction refactoring tool, which only suggested a minor refactoring unrelated to our concern
assignments (i.e., to move all data fields into separate data-field-only classes). While automated
refactoring tools work with less effort than IVCon, they cannot in general predict all the code a
programmer might want assigned to concerns.
To add the one feature to JHotDraw, we defined concerns for several operations related to
the feature, and most of the concerns we defined were scattered in one way or the other. For
instance, concerns such as OpenFile and SaveFile (pertaining to implementations of saving and
opening files respectively) were scattered across multiple files, whereas concerns such as EndApp
(code that gets executed when a JHotDraw application is terminated) and PanelOperations (code
that gets executed when windows within the application are opened or closed) were scattered
within the same file. Other concerns that we defined included code that implemented the new
feature (AskUsersForSave concern) and code that imported various packages (Import). Code
implementing these two concerns was not scattered, but assigning these code segments to a concern
proved to be useful because we were updating these code segments frequently and upon unweaving,
it became easier to locate them.
Similarly to the JHotDraw case study, most of the concerns in the Java Scientific Calculator
case study were scattered. However, contrary to JHotDraw, they were mostly scattered within the
same file itself. Again, a majority of the concerns that we defined in this case study were feature-
specific, and defining these concerns enabled us to readily locate the code that we were frequently
updating. For example, to implement the first feature (i.e., additional memory slots), we defined
concerns named NewMemoryButton (for adding new buttons to the calculator), ButtonBackend
(for handling the backend operations of buttons e.g., initializing buttons, button listener etc.),
and MemoryBackend (for initializing and accessing memory locations for the calculator’s memory
buttons). The only concern that was scattered across multiple files in the Java Scientific Calculator
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Table 4.3. Test-file characteristics.
File Name File Size Total No. of Total No. of Avg. Region Max. Region(LoC) Concerns Regions Size (chars) Size (chars)
IVCON.java 61 5 7 135.9 337
Windows.java 2,849 20 84 914.4 24,902
StressTest.java 100,000 1,000 5,000 998.0 3,794
was the feature-specific concern pertaining to the addition of the grade unit for angle measurement,
the GradeAngle concern.
IVCon helped us in the same way for this case study as it did for the first case study. Addition-
ally, because of the larger code bases that we working with during this case study, we encountered
multiple cases of a concern crosscutting through several files. For such concerns, being able to open
multiple files as part of a project proved to be useful; we saved all files that a concern crosscut
as part of a project, which in turn ensured quick access to every instance of the relevant concern.
Moreover, we observed that for the JHotDraw case study, being able to define multi-concern code
proved to be useful. The feature-specific concern (AskUsersForSave) that we were implementing
overlapped with other concerns such as OpenFile, SaveFile, PanelOperations etc., and flags
in the AskUsersForSave concern-module served as a quick aid to locate the position within the
concern-module where we wanted to make changes.
4.1.3 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the practicality of our design, we tested1 IVCon by assigning code to concerns in two
of our own IVCon source-code files: IVCON.java and Windows.java, respectively containing 61 and
2849 lines of Java code (in the woven view) and 7 and 84 regions assigned to 5 and 20 total concerns.
We also created an impractically large file of 100,000 lines, each containing 20 randomly generated
single-character tokens, in order to stress test IVCon’s performance. Figure 4.3 summarizes our
test-file characteristics. We emphasize that StressTest.java would be an unreasonably large (2-
1The tests were performed on a Dell Latitude D830 with dual Intel Core2 2.2 GHz CPUs and 2 GB of RAM,
running Windows XP. The times represent real time at low average load. We performed each test in sets of 100; the
results shown are the averages of those sets. During stress testing, we had to increase the virtual machine’s heap size
to 1.5 GB.
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Table 4.4. Performance opening and saving files.
File Size Type of File File-open File-save(LoC) Time (ms) Time (ms)
.java file 12.96 9.09
61 .ivc file (no concerns) 30.78 12.60
.ivc file (5 concerns) 33.59 15.53
.java file 66.72 42.56
2,849 .ivc file (no concerns) 367.81 216.29
.ivc file (20 concerns) 413.22 250.14
.java file 11,582.80 474.36
100,000 .ivc file (no concerns) 16,162.50 4,756.17
.ivc file (1000 concerns) 16,374.81 5,693.11
Table 4.5. Performance assigning code to concerns.
File Region Number of Concern-
Size Size Nested assignment
(LoC) (LoC) Regions Time (ms)
61 61 7 23.78
2,849 500 21 73.862,849 84 295.51
1,000 53 760.95
100,000 10,000 525 10,246.56
100,000 5,000 104,976.56
million-token) source-code file in practice; we included it in our test suite to better understand
IVCon’s performance limitations.
IVCon allows users to open and save Java source-code (.java) files and IVCon (.ivc) files.
IVCon files contain several serialized objects: the Java source-code string in the woven view (which
is stored independently of any .java files), plus IVCon’s regionMap, concernMap, and regionTree
for that program. We measured IVCon’s performance opening and saving our test files as .java
files, .ivc files with no concerns defined, and .ivc files with all concerns defined. Table 4.4 displays
the results. IVCon opens and saves .java files more quickly than .ivc files (which contain several
potentially large, serialized data structures). As expected, IVCon’s file-open and file-save times are
proportional to the length of the Java code being processed and the sizes of objects being serialized.
The file-save times in Table 4.4 do not include the time taken to close the files, but file-closing times
were negligible (i.e., unobservably small for all but the StressTest files, which took about 83ms
to close).
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Table 4.6. Performance editing concern colors and removing concerns.
File Size Number of Characters Concern-edit Concern-removal
(LoC) Assigned to Concern Time (ms) Time (ms)
61 332 7.34 9.41
1,531 14.80 27.87
2,849 1,789 22.95 40.02
3,386 30.15 98.40
23,335 367.29 512.38
100,000 38,462 419.38 685.00
85,069 810.26 1,050.18
Table 4.7. Performance weaving and unweaving code.
Lines of Number Holes in Weaving Unweaving
Woven of Unwoven Time Time
Code Concerns Body (ms) (ms)
61 0 0 3.27 2.665 7 7.03 18.76
2,849 0 0 66.45 57.3620 127 943.22 625.45
100,000 0 0 3,527.19 3,445.311,000 7,760 537,959.40 89,534.50
Although creating a new concern in IVCon takes only a constant amount of time and is a
fast (0ms to 16ms) operation, we next describe IVCon’s performance during three heavier-weight
concern-manipulation operations. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show IVCon’s performance during concern
assignment, editing, and removal. IVCon’s performance when assigning code to a concern (Ta-
ble 4.5) depends on the size of the region r being assigned to the concern and the number of regions
nested within r; higher values for these two parameters imply more considerations of code-color
changes and therefore more time to complete the concern-assignment operation. Because editing
concern names takes a negligible amount of time (0ms to 16ms), the biggest factor in editing a
concern is actually changing its color (Table 4.6), which again depends on the amount of text (i.e.,
the number and size of regions) assigned to the concern being recolored. Similarly, when a user
completely removes a concern in the woven view, most of the time IVCon spends completing this
operation involves recoloring the code that had been assigned to that concern; hence, concerns
assigned to more and larger regions take more time to remove than concerns assigned to fewer and
smaller regions.
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Finally, we measured IVCon’s performance weaving and unweaving code, as presented in Ta-
ble 4.7. Based on the descriptions of these algorithms in Section 2.2.2, we would expect that the
biggest factors determining weaving and unweaving times are the number of concerns being woven
or unwoven, the number of holes being filled in or created, and the number of characters filling
in or being extracted from holes. The results in Table 4.7 match these expectations. Completely
weaving and unweaving code in all the reasonable-sized test files took less than one second.
In summary, our performance results demonstrate that the prototype implementation is efficient
when operating on reasonably sized source-code files. However, the implementation would need
additional optimizations to perform tolerably efficiently on extremely large source-code files, such
as those containing millions of source-language tokens.
4.2 LoPSiL
This section describes our experiences working with LoPSiL and summarizes the performance
overhead incurred from using LoPSiL on a mobile device2.
4.2.1 Case Studies
To test the usefulness of the location constructs that we have defined for LoPSiL, we imple-
mented and tested several small location-based policies using LoPSiL. The first of these is an exam-
ple of the sort of policy a user might wish to enforce on untrusted third-party software, while the
other three are examples of policies that application developers might wish to enforce on their own
software. We have enforced and tested versions of all these example policies on Java applications
executing on a roaming laptop.
• Access-control Policy3: Our first example is a privacy-based access-control policy that con-
strains an application’s ability to read location data at particular times. The policy, shown
in Figure 4.1, requires that monitored applications can only access the device’s GPS data
from 08:00 (8am) to 18:00 (6pm) on workdays. A user might want to enforce such a policy
to prevent an employer-provided application from learning the device’s location when the
employee is not at work (e.g., so the employer does not know where the employee shops, or
2For a detailed analysis of our performance tests, we refer readers to our journal article [32].
3We thank Sean Barbeau for suggesting this policy.
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public class NoGpsOutsideWorkTime extends Policy {
public synchronized Reaction react(Action a) {
if(ActionPatterns.matchesGpsRead(a) && !TimeUtils.isWorkTime())
//return a null location to the application
return new Reaction("replace", null);
else return new Reaction("ok");
}
}
Figure 4.1. LoPSiL policy preventing an application from reading GPS data outside of work hours.
public class ShowNavigation extends Policy {
public LocationDevice[] devices = {new LopsilGPS(LopsilGPS.GARMIN)};
public PolicyAssumptions pa =
...
public synchronized void onLocationUpdate() {
if(devices[0].getLocation().
distance(getExpectedCurrentLocation(), Units.METERS)>10)
AppGUI.displayNavigationalAid();
}
}
Figure 4.2. Abbreviated LoPSiL policy requiring that navigational aid appear when the device’s
current location deviates from its expected path.
how much time the employee spends in certain places during the employee’s off hours). In
fact, providing for the enforcement of such a policy might be the only way the employer could
convince the employee to run a work-related application on the employee’s mobile device.
• Deviation-from-path Policy: Our second example policy requires navigational aid to appear
when the device’s location deviates more than 10m off its expected path. The policy code,
shown in Figure 4.2, invokes a method called getExpectedCurrentLocation to determine
where the policy currently expects the device to be. Method getExpectedCurrentLocation
could return a location based on the route being displayed to the user (as in dashboard-
mounted GPS systems), on traffic conditions, on the path the user normally travels in this
area, etc.
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public class SafeRegion extends Policy {
private Location[] safeRegionEndpoints;
private boolean inRegion;
public SafeRegion() {
safeRegionEndpoints = getSafeRegionLocs();
inRegion = devices[0].getLocation().inRegion(safeRegionEndpoints);
}
public PolicyAssumptions pa = ...
public synchronized void onLocationUpdate() {
inRegion = devices[0].getLocation().inRegion(safeRegionEndpoints);
}
public synchronized Reaction react(Action a) {
if(!inRegion && ActionPatterns.matchesPlainWrite(a)) {
String encMsg = encrypt(a.getArgs()[0].toString());
try { //to replace the unencrypted send with an encrypted send
((BufferedWriter)(a.getCaller())).write(encMsg);
} catch(IOException e) {...}
return new Reaction("replace", null);
} else return new Reaction("ok");
}
}
Figure 4.3. Abbreviated LoPSiL policy requiring robot-control software to encrypt outgoing mes-
sages when the robot is outside a secure-region perimeter.
• Safe-region Policy4: Another interesting sort of policy expressible in LoPSiL is shown in
Figure 4.3. This policy, intended to monitor software on a robot, requires the robot to
encrypt all outgoing communications when the robot’s location is outside a secure-region
perimeter.
• Social-networking Policy: Our final example is a social-networking policy in which the user’s
friends get invited to rendezvous when the user travels to a new area. Specifically, the policy
requires that if:
– the device has traveled more than 100km over the past 2 hours (i.e., average speed has
been more than 50km/hr),
– the device has traveled less than 2km over the past 20 minutes (implying that the user’s
travels have at least temporarily ended), and
4We thank Robin Murphy for suggesting this policy.
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public class InviteFriendsInNewArea extends Policy {
//maintain a buffer of two hours’ worth of location data
private LocBuffer longBuf = new LocBuffer(2, Units.HOURS);
//maintain another buffer of twenty minutes’ worth of location data
private LocBuffer shortBuf = new LocBuffer(20, Units.MINUTES);
private Time timeLastInvited = Time.NEVER;
public PolicyAssumptions pa = ...
public synchronized void onLocationUpdate() {
Location currentLoc = devices[0].getLocation();
longBuf.add(currentLoc);
shortBuf.add(currentLoc);
if(longBuf.earliest().distance(currentLoc, Units.KILOMETERS)>100
&& shortBuf.earliest().distance(currentLoc, Units.KILOMETERS)<2
&& timeLastInvited.elapsed(Time.getCurrentTime(),Units.HOURS)>1)
{
Location[] friendLocs = getFriendLocations();
inviteLocalFriends(friendLocs,currentLoc,20,Units.KILOMETERS);
timeLastInvited = Time.getCurrentTime();
}
}
}
Figure 4.4. A location-dependent social-networking policy specified in LoPSiL.
– the policy enforcer has not sent invitations to friends in the past hour,
then the policy enforcer must:
– broadcast a “Where are you?” message to all friends in the user’s address book,
– collect responses from the friends, and
– send invitations to meet to those friends now within 20km of the user.
An abbreviated LoPSiL policy specifying such constraints appears in Figure 4.4.
4.2.2 Experiential Observations
Having implemented the example policies described in above, we believe that the six core
constructs underlying LoPSiL serve as good abstractions for specifying location-dependent runtime
security policies. This belief stems from the fact that LoPSiL was sufficiently expressive for us to
specify every location-dependent policy we considered enforcing. In addition, after implementing
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LoPSiL, none of the example policies took us more than 2 hours to design, specify, and test.
Although these results are encouraging, we need more experience with LoPSiL, and feedback from
other users, before we can more completely and objectively evaluate its expressiveness and ease of
use.
Another interesting outcome of designing these example policies is that we have observed some
common, recurring uses of location information in security and privacy policies. Our location-
dependent policies consistently based policy decisions on:
• The current absolute location of the device (e.g., whether the device is in the user’s office)
• The geographic relationship of the device’s current location with another location (e.g.,
whether the device is north of or within 1km of another location)
• The geographic relationship of the device’s current location with a region of locations (e.g.,
whether the device is in an area of trusted terrain or within 10m of an expected path)
• The velocity or acceleration of the device
Because location-dependent policies consistently use location information in these ways, we provide
several utility methods in LoPSiL for calculating distances, boundaries, velocities, and accelerations
between locations. All policies can access these utility methods (Figures 4.2–4.4) and can define
custom operators on locations when the built-in methods are insufficient.
4.2.3 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the practicality of our proof-of-concept LoPSiL compiler, we measured the over-
head incurred from using four of our LoPSiL policies, AllowAll (Figure 3.1), AccessControl
(Figure 4.1), DeviationFromPath (Figure 4.2), and SocialNetworking (Figure 4.4)5. We recorded
the following metrics for the original application and for the rewritten application that enforces our
policies:
• Time taken for the application to finish execution.
• Memory usage of the application.
5Tests were conducted on an unlocked HTC Dream, that had a 528 MHz processor, 192 MB RAM, and 1 GB
storage. We thank Joshua Finnis for performing the various performance tests.
49
Table 4.8. Overhead incurred from using LoPSiL
Time Memory Battery usage Code
Policy taken usage (%age of size
(ms) (Bytes) total battery) (Bytes)
Base 36.981 2,967 16.25 13,379
AllowAll With Policy 37.725 3,211 16.88 68,939
Overhead 0.744 244 0.63 55,560
Base 86.203 3,976 27.00 14,386
AccessControl With Policy 102.458 4,168 26.88 70,394
Overhead 16.255 192 -0.12 56,008
Base 3.258 4,821 6.38 15,419
DeviationFromPath With Policy 26.254 5,196 10.50 71,602
Overhead 22.996 375 4.12 56,183
Base 2.450 4,679 5.38 14,142
SocialNetworking With Policy 82.860 5,035 9.88 71,357
Overhead 80.410 356 4.50 57,215
• Battery usage of the application.
• Code size of the application.
The results from our experiments are summarized in Table 4.8, in which we mention for each
policy and metric, the recorded value for the application without the policy enforced (mentioned as
Base), the recorded value with the policy enforced (mentioned as With Policy), and the difference
between the two values (mentioned as Overhead).
We observe that in terms of the running time of an application, the base overhead incurred from
using LoPSiL was approximately 2%. We measure the base overhead of LoPSiL as the overhead
from the AllowAll policy, because the AllowAll policy allows all actions and does not perform any
additional computations. On the other hand, all the other policies perform additional computations
to determine the result of a security-relevant method, and those additional computations increase
significantly the running time of the application with those policies enforced. Additionally, on
average, the memory usage overhead was recorded to be 6.5%, which is seemingly reasonable. The
average battery usage overhead was 16.5% (the 95% confidence interval is between -3.2% to 36.4%).
Battery usage in Android is reported with a granularity of 1% of total battery usage, which explains
the negative overhead of -0.12% in the AccessControl policy. Another interesting overhead to
observe is the increased code size of the application. This overhead ranges approximately between
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55 kB and 57 kB, and most of the increased code size (55 kB, as can be observed from the AllowAll
base policy) is attributed to the LoPSiL libraries.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed in this thesis, two tools that enable users to modularize their code: We have
discussed IVCon, a GUI-based tool for conveniently creating, examining, and modifying code in,
and translating between, woven and unwoven views of code. IVCon differs from existing aspect-
visualization tools by providing a combination of (1) translations between woven and unwoven views
(2) many-to-many relationships between concerns and code, (3) token-level granularity in concern
assignment, and (4) a GUI designed to make all of this convenient. We have also discussed LoPSiL,
which enables users to modularize security code using traditional modularization units (aspects).
LoPSiL differs from existing policy-specification languages because, as far as we are aware, it is the
first Turing-complete policy-specification language that provides users with language constructs for
conveniently specifying location-based constraints.
This chapter concludes this thesis by discussing some of the lessons that we have learned about
code modularization and providing several extensions to this work.
5.1 Discussion
Encapsulating code segments into methods and replacing them with calls to those methods pro-
duces a well-structured program, and provided that chosen method names are descriptive enough,
it aids program comprehension. However, such practices adversely affect the code-maintenance
process. We observed these problems while working on the JHotDraw case study described in
Section 4.1.1.2. During the case study, although we could understand how JHotDraw was imple-
mented, we had to browse through several files to locate the exact place in the code where we
had to make changes to implement the desired functionality in JHotDraw. This, we observed,
happens because traditional modularization techniques (such as Extract into Method, Extract
into Class etc.) ultimately lead to the scattering of concern implementations. IVCon targets this
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scattering problem by displaying concern implementations in the context of the rest of the program
(i.e, the complete program) in one view (i.e, the woven view), and provides the standard benefits
of code modularization by isolating concern implementations from the program core in the other
view (i.e, the unwoven view).
While working on the case studies described in Section 4.1.1, we gained further insights into
the benefits of modularizing code using IVCon, including how IVCon would be best used in a
practical setting. To reap maximum benefits from IVCon, we propose that programmers should
use IVCon as part of the development process; programmers should assign code to concerns as they
are writing it. We observed (while creating and implementing feature-specific concerns for new
features) that assigning code to concerns while writing it incurs very little overhead. We expect
this overhead would be much less than the overheads of 1.03% and 1.59% that we reported in our
case studies (Sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2, respectively). Also, we could further reduce this overhead
by implementing an interface that is more conducive to concern assignment than IVCon’s current
interface, which is primarily targeted towards providing woven and unwoven views of user code and
conveying the benefit of IVCon’s concern modules.
While IVCon provides multiple software-engineering benefits by modularizing concern code,
it provides no constructs for encapsulating or interfacing with that modularized code. That is,
programmers may modify unwoven concern code arbitrarily, as long as the resulting woven program
is (lexically, syntactically, and semantically) valid. The woven and unwoven views are equivalent,
but only the woven view is checked for validity—during compilation IVCon checks that the woven
program is valid Java, and after weaving (and before unweaving) IVCon checks that all declared
regions begin at token beginnings and end at token endings.
For example, it is possible in the unwoven view to declare a new variable for one concern that
another concern will then implicitly have access to. As long as the woven program is valid, such
modifications are allowed, and IVCon’s interface currently provides no indication of which variables
are in scope at which parts of unwoven code (though one could imagine extending IVCon with such
a feature). For now, IVCon users can only see which variables are in scope in the unwoven view by
switching to, and examining code in, the woven view. In general, we expect that there will always
be some tasks that are easier to perform in the woven view (e.g., understanding which variables are
in scope at given positions), while others are easier to perform in the unwoven view (e.g., changing
53
the messages output in an audit concern); after all, these differences are what motivated IVCon
and its ability to work in and translate between the woven and unwoven views.
In the presence of functionally orthogonal code segments, IVCon’s concern modules provide
the same benefits to users as traditional modularization techniques. For example, if we use IVCon
to isolate code implementing security in a program, we can view all security code in one place in
the unwoven-concerns panel (in the unwoven view), which offers program comprehension benefits
similar to those offered by policy-specification languages.
Also, we have derived from our experiences working with LoPSiL that traditional modulariza-
tion techniques prove to be a good solution for modularizing CCCs that are functionally orthogonal
to the functionality of the rest of the program. This is why we used AspectJ, a traditional modu-
larization technique, to implement LoPSiL. Our belief is further confirmed by the fact that aspect-
oriented languages are typically used to implement the logging functionality (which is typically a
functionally-orthogonal concern) in many applications.
5.2 Future Work
Several opportunities exist for improving upon work that we have discussed in this thesis. Some
of the directions that this work could take on in the future are enumerated as follows:
• We would like to collect data from other users to measure IVCon’s effectiveness at improving
the software development process. Moreover, we would like to further evaluate IVCon’s
empirical performance to determine whether and how the weaving and unweaving operations
could be optimized, especially for larger source-code files.
• It would also be useful for IVCon to let users select a subset of concerns to export to an
external file. This would provide a benefit similar to Hyper/J’s on-demand remodularization,
with which users can specify a set of features to include in their program [25]. We expect
that implementing this capability would require only minor changes to IVCon’s unweaving
algorithm. A more challenging problem, however, would be to display in one location, concern
code from CCCs that span multiple files in a project. This would enable users to independently
reason about and edit CCCs from various files in one location.
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Figure 5.1. IVCon’s newer interface for reduced concern assignment times.
• Although our prototype version of IVCon is aimed towards users programming in a Java
environment, we believe that the principles underlying IVCon apply to software in any lan-
guage. To validate our belief, we would like to add support for other languages to IVCon .
Again, we expect that implementing this capability would entail making minor changes to
the interface (to allow for users to select the environment they wish to work in), and adding
JavaCC grammars of other languages to IVCon’s lexer (to lexically validate user code and
enforce token-level granularity).
• We could reduce the overhead incurred from the concern-assignment process by making minor
changes to IVCon’s interface. One of the features that would reduce this overhead would be to
enable users to import concerns (concern names and colors) from other IVCon files; doing so
would reduce the time taken to define concerns by eliminating the need to specify a name and
a color for concerns. Additionally, it would ensure consistency in the choice of concern colors
across different files. Another feature that would reduce the concern-assignment overhead
would be the use of toggle buttons for concern assignments. In such an interface, users would
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toggle a concern button (one for every concern) to “ON” to either (1) assign selected code to
the concern, (2) de-assign the concern from the selected code, or (3) assign to the concern,
text that the user will type. Moreover, users would not be prompted to specify names for
regions; instead, the new interface would consist of an activity panel that would inform users
that a region with the name “concernname region i” has been defined, and would provide
a link to allow users to change the name of the region. Figure 5.1 illustrates this proposed
interface.
• We would like to model our IVCon language in a formal calculus and prove that (1) our
translation algorithms are inverses of each other, (2) our translations are semantics preserving
(i.e., translation soundness), and (3) we can unweave any concern in any woven program and
weave any concern into any unwoven program (i.e., translation completeness).
• Concern information obtained by users explicitly assigning code to concerns can tell us how
concerns are related to each other. More specifically, it can help tell us whether a concern is
functionally orthogonal to another concern or not. Using this information we can suggest to
users whether or not it makes sense to refactor code segments into different classes or not.
• Instead of using a GUI-based tool to define concern assignments in code, we could alternatively
implement a language that allows users to “code” the concern assignments. This could be
made possible by using Java annotations in order to mark the beginning and end of regions.
Having such a language would possibly reduce the overhead of concern assignment that we
have described in our case studies (by eliminating the time that a user takes to select code
before assigning it to a concern).
• We could extend LoPSiL to allow users to specify and enforce multiple policies on their
programs. As previous work has shown, this would increase a user’s effort while specifying
policies because users will have to ensure that their policies are effectless [5, 4]. Moreover, we
would have to provide mechanisms within LoPSiL that can combine decisions from various
policies.
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• As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, as a result of using AspectJ as our application-rewriter, our im-
plementation does not make decisions about the execution of library methods invoked by other
library methods. As a result LoPSiL does not provide complete mediation of security-relevant
methods. We could circumvent this limitation by writing our own LoPSiL enforcement-code
inliner (e.g., using tools like the Bytecode Engineering Library [65]), as previous work has
done [2, 4, 5], but at the price of significantly increased implementation complexity.
• Finally, we would like to model LoPSiL in a formal language so that we have a complete and
implementation-independent specification of our language.
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